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Settlement of International Commercial Disputes
by Michael A. Almond*
International traders as a rule do not want to argue with their con-
tract partners; they simply want to "do" business with them. Given this
rather straightforward objective, it often perplexes businessmen why the
terms of that agreement hammered out in a Frankfurt hotel room or
Tokyo steak house are so difficult to reduce to writing once the lawyers
are brought in. In that magic moment when at last the deal is struck, the
notion that one of the parties may later choose not to keep his promise is
usually not given a second thought. Indeed, businessmen and their attor-
neys will often be able to anticipate most potential problems and to
avoid many altogether. But inevitably, and for any number of reasons,
some deals go sour. When this happens, the client is suddenly confronted
with new and unfamiliar problems, and the decisions made by his attor-
ney during this emergency situation will be of crucial importance.
This article is intended to cover that situation. Its scope is more
limited than the title might suggest for its primary purpose is to acquaint
the North Carolina practitioner with some of the unique and specialized
problems which arise in representing clients who find themselves in seri-
ous disagreement with their contract partners in other countries. The
discussion which follows will presume that the dispute arises in a com-
mercial context involving an import or export transaction and a North
Carolina buyer/seller. The buyer, for example, may fail to pay for goods
delivered or may refuse to accept delivery at all. The seller, for his part,
may ship inferior, defective, or otherwise nonconforming goods, or may
divert his inventory to another customer willing to pay a higher price.
Either or both may fail to perform in a timely manner.
If formal proceedings for relief are necessary, the basic issue will be
simple: the client will want either to enforce his contract partner's obliga-
tions or avoid his own. The means to this end will usually be limited to
litigation in state or federal court in the United States, litigation in a
foreign country, or some form of arbitration.
The sections which follow will focus on four common problem areas:
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obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign defendant; choosing the law appli-
cable to the controversy; choosing a particular forum for the resolution of
the dispute (including the enforcement of arbitration agreements); and
enforcing judgments or arbitral awards against the liable party.
I. Jurisdiction
Some situations clearly call for the assistance of foreign counsel. if
the foreign party institutes legal action in its own courts against the
North Carolina party, it will be necessary in almost every case to entrust
the defense of such action to an attorney abroad who is thoroughly famil-
iar with the procedure and substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction.
Or, if the North Carolinian elects to sue as plaintiff in the foreign court,
foreign counsel will likewise be indispensable. In either case, while the
North Carolina attorney will no doubt wish to monitor the proceedings
carefully, the overall responsibility for the defense of the action must lay
with foreign counsel.
If, on the other hand, the foreign party institutes an action against
one's client in North Carolina, the controversy is no different from any
other routine, local litigation matter except that, coincidentally, the case
involves a foreign plaintiff.
Usually it will be preferable to institute an action in the local courts
(either state or federal)i against the foreign defendant. At the outset,
rather specialized rules will apply, for plaintiffs counsel must first estab-
lish proper jurisdiction over a defendant whose domicile may be
thousands of miles away and who may never have set foot or done busi-
ness in North Carolina.
A. Personal Jurisdiction." The "Long-Arm" and "Mini'mum Contacts"
Subject matter jurisdiction should pose no problem since the contro-
versy will normally involve allegations of breach of contract. Jurisdic-
I Provided the requisite jurisdictional amount is in controversy, a North Carolina plain-
tiff could commence his action in the local federal district court due to the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties. Subsection (a)(2) of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was amended in 1976 and now
provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between- . . . (2) cittiens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2) (1972) (emphasis added).
Note, however, that an action commenced against a foreign-country defendant in state
court might not remain there. Citizens of foreign countries are entitled to remove cases to
federal court on the same basis as any other nonresident defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1972). Turnabout, in this circumstance at least, is not considered fair play. If, for example, a
foreign plaintiff commences an action against a North Carolina defendant in state court, the
North Carolina defendant has no right to remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
(1972). Where no federal question is involved, "such action[s] shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought." Id.
In any event, the general rule is that, absent some federal statute, federal courts in diversity
cases are to apply the appropriate state law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Arrow-
smith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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tion over the foreign defendant's person, however, poses a more difficult
question. While the nonresident defendant's actual physical presence
within North Carolina is not required, his absence will nevertheless re-
quire the plaintiff to demonstrate, first, that North Carolina law permits
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him, and, second, that the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not inconsistent with constitutional guar-
antees of due process of law.
2
The statutory scope of in personam jurisdiction in North Carolina is
controlled by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4, and a plaintiff seeking to bind a
foreign defendant to a judgment of a North Carolina court must be pre-
pared to show that jurisdiction exists under one or more of the provisions
of this "long-arm" statute.3 Section 1-75.4 provides that "a court of this
State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a per-
son served in an action pursuant to Rule 40) of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure under any of the following circumstances. . . ." A number of the
statutory provisions which follow may be relied upon to establish juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant domiciled in a foreign country.
Subsection (1), for example, provides that jurisdiction is proper "in any
action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a
claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made
upon such party . . . (d) is engaged in substantial activity within this
State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or other-
wise. ' '4 Whether the foreign defendant's conduct amounts to "substan-
tial activity within this State" is a question for the court to decide.
Subsection (4) is more directly applicable to international transac-
tions. While primarily a products liability provision, subsection (4) au-
thorizes jurisdiction:
in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State
arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant,
provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either: a.
Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this State by or
on behalf of the defendants; or b. Products, materials or thing processed,
serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed
within this State in the ordinary course of trade.5
The really "long-arm" provisions are contained in subsection (5).
The reach of this subsection is literally worldwide, and in most cases in-
volving international trade or commerce, this subsection will provide the
2 "The resolution of this question [of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants] involves a two-fold determination. First, do the statutes of North Carolina permit the
courts of this jurisdiction to entertain this action against defendants. If so, does the exercise of
this power by the North Carolina courts violate due process of law." Dillon v. Numismatic
Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977).
3 Id. at 674, 231 S.E.2d at 629. Where a federal question exists, there are sometimes
federal "long arm" statutes to aid the district courts in obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1972).
4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1) (1969).
3 Id. § 1-75.4(4).
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statutory basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident foreign defendant.
Subsection (5) reads, in full, as follows:
(5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts.-[A court of this State having
jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person]
[i]n any action which:
a. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or
to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the de-
fendant to perform services within this State or to pay for
services to be performed in this State by the plaintiff; or
b. Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff
by the defendant within this State, or services actually
performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this
State if such performance within this State was authorized
or ratified by the defendant; or
c. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or
to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the de-
fendant to deliver or receive within this State, or to ship
from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of
value; or
d. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of
value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant on his order or direction; or
e. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of
value actually received by the plaintiff in this State from
the defendant through a carrier without regard to where
delivery to the carrier occurred.
6
As is obvious from the excerpts quoted above, the provisions of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 are quite broad and, in many cases, may overlap. In
addition, the North Carolina courts have long held that the "long-arm"
statute is to be liberally construed in favor of in personam jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants. 7 As a result, in the typical import/export
transaction where an actual transfer of goods is made or contemplated, a
North Carolina plaintiff should have little difficulty in establishing a
statutory basis for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
The power of any State to subject nonresidents to the jurisdiction of
its local courts is also limited by the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. The permissible reach of state long-arm statutes and
the applicable constitutional standards have been articulated in a fa-
mous trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, International Shoe Co.
v. Washington,8 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 9 and Hanson v. Denckla.'0
Briefly, these cases hold that in order to exercise in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have had sufficient
6 Id. § 1-75.4(5).
7 First Nat'l Bank of Shelby v. General Funding Corp., 30 N.C. App. 172, 226 S.E.2d 527
(1976); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 29 N.C. App. 513, 225 S.E.2d 137 (1976), rev'd
oihergrounds 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368
F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
10 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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"minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction "such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "ItI
Whether a foreign defendant has had sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with North Carolina is an issue which must be decided at the
threshold of the litigation. Whenever there is a foreign defendant, plain-
tiff should expect at the pre-answer stage a motion to dismiss under
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).1 2 In a typical import/export transaction, how-
ever, such a defense is not likely to prevail. The North Carolina courts,
for example, have been quite liberal in applying the "minimum con-
tacts" standard,' 3 and have held that a single contract may alone pro-
11 326 U.S. at 316. Recently the Court has decided two cases which may suggest that the
limits of "long-arm" jurisdiction have been reached and that state courts must apply the "mini-
mum contacts" rule with greater regard for the rights of nonresident defendants. In Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court held that the mere presence of defendant's property
within a State was not sufficient to subject defendant to in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. For
the first time the Court held that the traditional "minimum contacts" rationale applicable to in
personam jurisdiction would likewise be applied to situations in which state courts are called
upon to exercise jurisdiction over defendant's property only. "We therefore conclude that all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny." (emphasis added).
Schaffer v. Heitner has important implications for international litigation. Suppose, for
example, that a foreign company is not otherwise subject to "long-arm" jurisdiction, but owns
real or personal property in North Carolina. In the past the property itself provided the juris-
dictional basis for a judgment. The property could then be attached and sold. Now, however,
such in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction is subject to the same "minimum contacts" standard as
in personam jurisdiction. Thus foreign defendants can be expected to make a special appear-
ance to contest the North Carolina court's jurisdiction over their property located here.
In Kulko v. Super. Ct., 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978), the Court reaffirmed the "minimum con-
tacts" rule, but held that a New York defendant had had insufficient contact with California to
sustain in personam jurisdiction. In Kulko the Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court
of California, holding that:
While the interests of the forum State and of the plaintif in proceeding with the cause in
the plaintif's forum of choice are of course to be considered, . . . an essential criterion in all
cases is whether the 'quahty and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reason-
able'and fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State. . . . [W]e believe that
the'California Supreme Court's application of the minimum contacts test in this
case represents an unwarranted extension of lnternational Shoe and would, if sus-
tained, sanction a result that is neither fair, just nor reasonable. Id. at 1697 (em-
phasis added).
It cannot be disputed that California has substantial interests in protecting
resident children and in facilitating child support actions on behalf of those chil-
dren. But these interests simply do not make California a 'fair forum' . . . . We
therefore believe that the state courts in the instant case failed to heed our admo-
nition that 'the flexible standard of International Shoe does not herald the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts.' Id. at
1701.
These latest cases indicate a determination by the Court to enforce limits on the reach of
"long-arm" statutes. Significantly in Kulko, Shaffer, and Hanson v. Denckla, the Court con-
cluded that jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants did not exist under the standard ap-
plied by the trial court.
12 N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) provides for an affirmative defense or a motion to dismiss based
upon "lack of jurisdiction over the person."
13 "State legislatures have responded to these expanding notions of due process
with 'long-arm' legislation designed to keep abreast of this jurisdictional trend
and to make available to the courts of their states the full jurisdictional powers
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vide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 14
Again, in a typical international transaction and under applicable
legal precedents, a North Carolina plaintiff should be able to withstand
both statutory and constitutional challenges to the court's in personam
jurisdiction. This may, however, turn out to be a rather hollow victory.
Defendant's purpose in raising the jurisdictional issue may not be so
much to escape the lawsuit as merely to delay it. An order denying de-
fendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, though
clearly interlocutory, is nevertheless immediately appealable. 15 More-
over, since the issue of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants involves "a substantial constitutional issue," an unsuccessful effort in
the North Carolina Court of Appeals would entitle defendant to appeal
as of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 16 A tremendous back-
log of undecided cases in the overworked and overburdened Court of
Appeals has meant that a foreign defendant determined to resist the ju-
risdiction of the North Carolina courts can tie the case in a procedural
knot which literally may take years to untangle.17 In many instances, the
delay inherent in the appellate process becomes an end in itself for de-
fendants, because it can easily require a year or more for a determination
by the North Carolina Supreme Court on the jurisdictional question
permissible under due process. Chapter 1, Article 6A of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes reflects this national approach to personal jurisdiction."
Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 705, 208 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1974).
In addition to the Supreme Court cases, supra notes 8-10, the following cases should be
useful to a practitioner confronted with a jurisdictional problem involving "minimum con-
tacts:" N.C. Supreme Court Cases: Byham v. House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965);
Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 208 S.E.2d 676 (1974); Dillon v. Funding Corp., 291
N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1974); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1965);
Goldman v. Parkland, 277 N.C. 233, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970); Putnam v. Publications, 245 N.C.
432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). N.C. Court of Appeals Cases: Andrews Associates v. Sodibar Sys-
tems, 25 N.C. App. 372, 213 S.E.2d 369 (1975); Andrews Associates v. Sodibar Systems, 28 N.C.
App. 663, 222 S.E.2d 922 (1976); Bank v. Funding Corp., 30 N.C. App. 172, 226 S.E.2d 527
(1976); Byrum v. Truck & Equipment Co., 32 N.C. App. 135, 231 S.E.2d 39 (1977); Dillon v.
Funding Corp., 29 N.C. App. 513, 225 S.E.2d 137 (1976); Duke University v. Chestnut, 28 N.C.
App. 568, 221 S.E.2d 895 (1976); Equity Assoc. v. Society for Savings, 31 N.C. App. 182, 228
S.E.2d 761 (1976); Goldman v. Parkland, 7 N.C. App. 400, 173 S.E.2d 15 (1970); Trust Co. v.
McDaniel, 18 N.C. App. 644, 197 S.E.2d 556 (1973); Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 37 N.C.
App. 26 (1978). Federal Cases: Bowman v. Curt T. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966);
Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp. 368 (M.D.N.C. 1967);
Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Sparrow v.
Goodman, 376 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Staley v. Homeland, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1344
(E.D.N.C. 1974); Stephenson v. Jordan Volkswagen, Inc. 428 F. Supp. 195 (W.D.N.C. 1977);
United Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Robb, 391 F. Supp. 626, 630-31 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
14 Set, e.g., First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. McDaniel, 18 N.C. App. 644, 197 S.E.2d
556 (1973).
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1969).
16 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1969); N.C.R. APp. P. 14 (1978).
17 The Clerk of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Frank E. Dail, estimates that the
interval between docketing an appeal and oral argument is approximately eleven months in a
civil case and four months in a criminal case. Thereafter several weeks or months may be
required for the court to hand down its decision in a particular case.
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alone. Only after this issue is finally resolved will defendant be required
to address the merits of plaintiff's complaint.
B. Service of Process18
Once a potential plaintiff is satisfied that the jurisdictional facts of
his case can withstand statutory and constitutional scrutiny, plaintiff
must see to it that the foreign defendant is properly served with the sum-
mons and complaint before that jurisdiction may be exercised.19 While
the General Assembly and courts have liberalized their views toward
"long-arm" jurisdiction, this expansion in judicial power has been ac-
companied by increased concern that the legal formalities for service of
process be strictly complied with, particularly where nonresident defend-
ants are involved.2 0 N.C.R. Civ. P. 40)21 sets forth several alternatives
for putting a foreign defendant on notice of the pending action against
him. Counsel should carefully select the particular subsection most ap-
propriate to the case and see to it that its requirements are scrupulously
and literally complied with. Rule 4(j)(9), by its terms, establishes an "al-
ternative method of service" for defendants who cannot be served within
the state and who are not inhabitants of or cannot be found within
North Carolina, and is the most useful section in serving nonresident de-
fendants.
Rule 4(j) (9) contemplates service of process in one of three ways.
First, personal service is authorized, 22 but such service is often impracti-
cal due to the difficulty and expense of locating someone in a foreign
country to serve process on the defendant, even though the summons and
complaint may be served by "anyone who is not a party and is not less
than twenty-one years of age or anyone duly authorized to serve sum-
mons by the law of the place where service is to be made."
'23
Second, Rule 4(j)(9)(c) provides for service of process by publica-
tion, otherwise known as constructive notice to defendant of the action
against him. If possible, service by publication should be avoided since it
is the method most vulnerable to constitutional attack on due process
18 See generally, Louis, Modem Statutory Approaches to Service of Process Outside the
State-Comparing the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure with the Uniform Interstate and International
Practice Act, 49 N.C.L. REV. 235 (1971); Note, Civtl Procedre-Constitutionality of Constructive Service
of Process on Missing Defendants, 48 N.C.L. REV. 616 (1970).
19 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-75.4, -75.6 (1969).
20 Edwards v. Edwards, 13 N.C. App. 166, 185 S.E.2d 20 (1971).
21 The federal counterpart is FED. R. Civ. P. 4. While elaborate federal procedures are
established in this Rule, subsections (d)(7), (e) and (f) authorize service of process "in the man-
ner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of sum-
mons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of that state."
Note also that there is a federal statute designed to assistforeign plaintiffs in their efforts to
obtain service of process over United States defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1972).
22 N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)a.
23 Id. 4(a).
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grounds, particularly where foreign defendants are involved. 24 In addi-
tion, if the only basis for the exercise of the domestic court's jurisdiction
is service by publication, courts in the defendant's country of domicile
may refuse to enforce any default judgment obtained against defend-
ant.
25
By far the easiest, least expensive, and quickest way to notify a for-
eign defendant of a pending lawsuit is by mail. Service by certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested, is expressly authorized by Rule
4(j)(9)(b) 26 and (d), 27 and is the most common manner in which foreign
defendants are served. The U.S. Postal Service offers international regis-
tered mail service at reasonable rates, and a signed return receipt can be
obtained. If a foreign defendant is properly served by mail according to
the Rule, plaintiff's counsel should be able to present the court with
proper proof of service, including defendant's signed return receipt, thus
facilitating both the availability and enforceability of a default judgment
if the defendant fails to appear.2 8
An important word of caution must be inserted here: while service
of process by international registered mail may prove the quickest, easi-
est, and least expensive way to bring in a foreign defendant, one should
be aware that the method used to effect service of process may later affect
plaintiff's ability to enforce its judgment against the defendant in his
home country, particularly if the judgment is obtained by default. As is
discussed t'fna,29 some countries refuse to enforce a default judgment ren-
dered by a U.S. court against a local resident unless process is served in a
manner satisfactory to the foreign court and consistent with foreign law
and procedure. Thus, while service by registered or certified mail may
be sufficient to bind the foreign defendant so far as the local state or
federal court is concerned, such service may be disregarded by foreign
courts when the plaintiff attempts to enforce his judgment abroad. It is
of paramount importance, then, that prior to commencing a lawsuit
24 See, e.g., Sink v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 202 S.E.2d 138 (1974). See also Note, supra note
18,
25 Set text accompanying notes 121-23, infma.
26 Note that Rule 4(j)(9)(b) does not require personal delivery to the addressee, but "con-
templates merely that the registered or certified mail be delivered to the address of the party to
be served and that a person of reasonable age and discretion receive the mail and sign the return
receipt on behalf of the addressee." Lewis Clarke Associates v. Tobler, 32 N.C. App. 435, 438,
232 S.E.2d 458, 459 (1977).
27 N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(d). As the North Carolina Comment to Rule 4(j)(9)d notes,
Subsection (9)(d).-This paragraph establishes alternative procedures when
service is to be made in a foreign country. It is based upon rule 4(i) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is itself drawn from Section 2.01 of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act. Under this paragraph one may enlist
the assistance of a foreign government and its laws in making service on a defen-
dant found within its territory, in order to insure the validity of the service and to
avoid any objection by the foreign government that efforts to make service there
constitute an encroachment on its sovereignty.
28 But see text accompanying notes 121-23, infta.
29 See text accompanying notes 121-23, nfa.
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against a foreign defendant, North Carolina counsel satisfy himself of the
enforceability of a judgment, including a default judgment, if service of
process is to be achieved solely by registered or certified mail. If counsel
determines that the enforceability of plaintiffs judgment may be com-
promised by the method of service of process employed, it may be advisa-
ble to associate a foreign attorney to insure that defendant is served "in
the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in
that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction. ' '30
Service in this manner will certainly satisfy the requirements of N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4 and should, in turn, be conclusive upon the foreign court in a
later action to enforce the judgment.31
Finally, it should be noted that.there are two procedures for effective
service of process by mail in Rule 40)(9).3 2 Whereas Rule 4(j)(9)(b)
authorizes plaintif's attorney to mail the summons and complaint,
(9)(d) (iv) requires the clerk to do so. 33 In most cases it will be less compli-
cated for the attorney to mail the summons and complaint, and service
effected in this manner is in compliance with the requirements of N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4. Subsection (9) (d) is expressly stated to contain "alternative pro-
visions for service in a foreign country." 34 Thus, plaintiffs attorney
should feel free to mail the summons and complaint himself or have the
clerk of court do so, at his discretion.
C Drafting Hint: Consent to Jurisdiction
It is elementary hornbook law that the parties to a lawsuit cannot
confer jurisdiction on a court by consent where such jurisdiction would
not otherwise exist. This maxim, however, applies only to subject matter
jurisdiction, and not to questions of in personam jurisdiction. Indeed,
North Carolina courts regard an alleged lack of in personam jurisdiction
as a purely personal defense which can be waived. 35
The question then arises whether a defendant can, by contract,
waive the defense in advance.36 Put another way, can a foreign party con-
sent as a matter of contract to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him by North Carolina courts? 37 In Jones v. Brinson,38 the Court held
30 N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(d)(i).
31 At least so far as service of process is concerned. See Part IV A, nfra.
32 See notes 26 and 27, supra.
33 Id.
34 N.C.R. Civ. P. 46)(9)(d).
35 See discussion of Jones v. Brinson, infa. While a court's subject matter jurisdiction is
subject to challenge at any time, even after appeal, it is clear that unless defendant pleads and
proves lack of personal jurisdiction the defense will be deemed waived.
36 "The principal common law bases for adjudicatory jurisdiction over individuals were
consent (voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction) and presence of the defendant ....
Consent seems obvious enough, although it may raise some doubts when extracted by the overwhelming bargain-
ing power of one party or when the consenting party is ignorant of the meaning of a standard consent clause
buried in masses overbiage." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 643
(1968) (emphasis added).
37 "[Iln federal courts a party may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he
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that:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action cannot be conferred bv consent of
the parties where it is not otherwise possessed by the court. Nor can jurisdiction
in this sense be conferred by waiver or estoppel. In short, it may not be
rested on agreements between the parties.
While it is true that no consent can give a court jurisdiction of the
subject matter of an action which the court does not possess without
such consent, it is equally true that a court may obtain jursdclton over the person
of a party litigant by his consent. This for the reason that it is a mere per-
sonal privilege of a defendant to require that he be served with process
in a legal manner, and since it is a personal privilege-even though of a
constitutional nature-he may consent to the jurisdiction of the court without
exacting performance of the usual legal formalities as to service of process. 39
It is true that no contractual consent to jurisdiction was present in the
Brinson case; there the conduct of one of the parties was construed by the
court as tantamount to consent. 40 Pulley v. Pulley,4 1 however, involved a
confession of judgment executed by defendant. The court reaffirmed the
Brinson rule and held that a party who has consented to personal jurisdic-
tion is later estopped to deny that such jurisdiction exists. The court
rejected defendant's attack on the confession of judgment, holding that
"[wle place our decision squarely upon the ground that defendant, under
all the facts here, is estopped to question the validity of his own confessed
judgment . . .and of the entry of judgment therefore by the Superior
Court of Onslow County .... 42
It would thus appear that many of the problems involving personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant can be avoided in advance by a
properly drafted contract provision, whereby the foreign party consents
to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction by North Carolina courts in
any action relating to or arising out of the contractual agreement.
One potential advantage of such a provision is that it could be
pleaded in bar of a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or in support of a motion to strike such a
defense. Citing Pulley, plaintiff should contend that the foreign defend-
ant is estopped to assert that 12(b)(2) defense.
If the motion to dismiss is denied, the unsuccessful defendant may
cannot be found for service of process through contractual designation of an 'agent' for receipt
of process in that jurisdiction. In [National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
315-16 (1974)] the Court stated:
'[I]t is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit
to the jurisdiction of a given court to permit notice to be served by the opposing
party, or even to waive notice altogether.' "
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972) (emphasis added).
38 238 N.C. 506, 78 S.E.2d 334 (1953).
39 Id. at 509, 78 S.E.2d at 337 (emphasis added).
40 Id. Note that in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842
(2d Cir. 1977), the court held that the mere inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract
designating a United States arbitrator provided a sufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction. See
Note, Arbitraitn Agreements, 3 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 274 (1978).
41 255 N.C. 423, 121 S.E.2d 876 (1961).
42 Id. at 432, 121 S.E.2d at 882.
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still attempt to appeal the judge's order. In this event, plaintiff should
move in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory and
premature. 4 3 While the refusal to dismiss amounts to an affirmation of
the court's jurisdiction over defendant, plaintiff should contend that the
consent provision, agreed to in advance by defendant, operates as a
waiver of defendant's right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) 44 to an in-
terlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issue. Simultaneously plaintiff
should attempt to have the trial court disregard the purported appeal
and proceed to the merits of the case. While the filing of a notice of
appeal normally divests the trial court ofjurisdiction, 45 "a litigant can-
not deprive the Superior Court ofjurisdiction to try and determine a case
on its merits by taking an appeal . . . from a non-appealable, interlocu-
tory order of the Superior Court."' 4 6 As the North Carolina Supreme
Court has noted, "where an interlocutory order is not subject to appeal,
the Superior Court need not stay proceedings pending dismissal of the
appeal in the Supreme Court.
'4 7
Where possible, then, a consent to jurisdiction clause should be in-
cluded in the contract upon which the international transaction is based.
I. Choice of Law48
A fundamental question for any court or arbitral panel is the proper
law to be applied in adjudicating or resolving an international commer-
cial dispute. The court or tribunal may have several choices available to
it. If the buyer and seller are domiciled in different countries, for exam-
ple, either the buyer's domestic law or the seller's may be held applica-
ble. If the same buyer and seller negotiated and executed their contract
in a third jurisdiction, that country's law could conceivably control the
outcome. Then again, the parties may arrange for the contract to be
performed in yet a fourth country, and under certain circumstances the
law of the place of performance may determine the result.
Conflicts of law problems are not unfamiliar in American jurispru-
dence. The federal nature49 of our system of government has inevitably
43 N.C.R. App. P. 37. North Carolina does not allow an interlocutory appeal unless dis-
missal affects some substantial right and will work injury to appellant if not corrected before
appeal from final judgment. See Jenkins v. Trantham, 244 N.C. 422, 94 S.E.2d 311 (1956);
Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1949).
44 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1969).
45 Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 870 (1971); American Floor Machine Co.
v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732, 133 S.E.2d 659 (1963).
46 Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. at 364, 57 S.E.2d at 382.
47 Harrell v. Harrell, 253 N.C. 758, 761, 117 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1961).
48 See generally Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules tn North Carohna, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243 (1970).
49 "In the exercise of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the federal district courts
must apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit, including its con-
flicts law. If the conflicts rule has not been decided by the state court, the federal
court must decide as it believes the supreme court of the state would rather than
as it'deems best. If the state law changes while a diversity case is on appeal, a
federal appellate court must apply the new state rule. Since, by definition diver-
sity cases involve parties from different states, they frequently present conflicts
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given rise to such conflicts problems since the earliest days of the Repub-
lic, and courts have often been required to determine which state's law
applies to interstate disputes.
50
The expertise developed in handling such interstate conflicts
problems has enabled most state courts to handle similar issues that have
arisen in the course of international business and commerce. The recent
trend toward uniformity in state commercial law, manifested by the na-
tionwide acceptance of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 1 has also re-
sulted in greater uniformity in the conflicts of law area, at least in the
commercial context.
Prior to the adoption of the UCC, North Carolina conflicts law
looked to the "lex loci celebrationis, ' '52 and our courts held that "in in-
terpreting a contract made outside of this State our courts long ago es-
tablished the principle that the law of the country where the contract is
made is the rule by which the validity of it, its exposition, and conse-
quences are to be determined. '53 "Moreover, it is a generally accepted
principle that 'the test of the place of a contract is as to the place at
which the last act was done by either of the parties essential to a meeting
of the minds. Until this act was done there was no contract, and upon its
being done at a given place, the contract became existent at the place
where the act was done.' "54
In those cases where the place of performance of the contract differs
from the place where the contract was made, North Carolina cases have
not developed a firm conflicts rule.55 'Even less clear is the effect to be
given by the North Carolina courts to a choice of law clause. For obvious
reasons, the parties to an interstate or international contract might wish
to agree in advance that, should a dispute arise, the law of a designated
jurisdiction would determine the controversy.
Prior to July 1, 1967, the enforceability in North Carolina of such
choice of law clauses was not clear. 56 On that date, however, the Uni-
form Commercial Code became effective and, at least in commercial
matters, new conflicts and choice of law rules were adopted. The Code's
problems the resolution of which composes a substantial part of the lore of con-
flict of laws. However, if another federal ground of jurisdiction is present, the
federal courts must apply federal conflict of laws rules." Id. at 245.
50 "In this country, the principles of conflict of laws developed primarily in interstate mat-
ters, . . . When international cases came up, the principles developed in the intranational cases
were transferred almost unquestioningly to the international matters." Cheatham, Some Develop-
ments in Conlit of Laws, 17 VAND. L. REV. 193, 200 (1963).
51 In North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to 10-107 (1965).
52 Wurfel, supra note 48, at 275.
53 Fast v. Gulley, 271 N.C. 208, 211, 155 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1967).
54 Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 515, 157 S.E. 860, 862 (1931).
55 As Professor Wurfel has pointed out, "[tlhe issue of whether questions of performance
are governed by the law of the place of contracting or of the place of performance has not been
conclusively decided in North Carolina." Wurfel, supra note 48, at 275.
56 But the North Carolina Supreme Court has hinted that such clauses might very well be
enforceable. See, e.g., Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
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conflicts provisions are set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-1-105, 5 7 which
provides that the parties to a commercial transaction may indeed choose
the law to be applied to their contract. 58 Absent such a choice of law
clause, moreover, the Code provides that the UCC should govern "trans-
actions bearing an appropriate relation to this State."' 59 While the Code
places certain limitations on the parties' ability to choose applicable
law,6° these restrictions primarily involve situations- where failure to ap-
ply Code provisions strictly would upset the entire statutory scheme, un-
dermine the goal of national uniformity, or prejudice the rights of third
parties and strangers to the contract. 6 1
When the parties include a choice of law clause in their contract,
section 1-105(1) should, insure that their choice is enforced and given ef-
fect by North Carolina courts, 62 assuming the limitations contained in
subsection (2) do not apply. Such a clause should be effective even
though the presiding judge may be required to enforce a foreign and
unfamiliar rule of law which is inconsistent with the articulated public
policy of the forum state.
63
57 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 (1965) reads as follows:
Territorial application of the act; parties' power to choose applicable
law.-(l) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears
a reasonable relation to this State and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this State or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this chapter applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this State.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this Chapter specifies the ap-
plicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to
the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods. (G.S. 25-2-402).
Applicability of the article on bank deposits and collections. (G.S. 25-4-102).
Bulk transfers subject to the article on bulk transfers. (G.S. 25-6-102).
Applicability of the article on investment securities. (G.S. 25-8-106).
Perfection provisions of the article on secured transactions. (G.S. 25-9-1030).
58 See generally Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniforni Commercial Code and the Choice ofLaw,
1969 DUKE L.J. 623 (1969); Wurfel, supra note 48, at 279-91.
59 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105(1), supra note 57. As the North Carolina Comment notes,
"[t]his may be a modification of prior law."
6 Id. § 25-1-105(2).
61 The Official Comment states that:
Subsection (2) spells out essential limitations on the parties' right to choose the
applicable law. Especially in Article 9 parties taking a security interest must have
sure ways to find out whether and where to file and where to look for possible
existing filings.
The North Carolina Comment to the UCC notes, in addition, that:
This subsection states a second limitation upon the general right to select the law
governing a transaction. The rationale of all five of the exceptions set forth is
two-fold: (1) the necessity of certainty as to the applicable law exists in the five
instances and (2) the inalienability by the contracting parties of rights of third
parties, generally creditors, under local law.
62 "The Code permits parties to select the law which will govern their rights and duties
provided that their transaction bears a reasonable relation to the state or nation whose law is
selected. The inference is that if the parties choose the law of some state which has no reason-
able relation to the transaction, that choice will not be recognized." Nordstrom & Ramerman,
supra note 58, at 626.
63 "One limitation courts should not place on choice of law clauses in commercial
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The more complicated issue involves the second sentence of section
1-105(1) which attempts to provide a conflicts rule in those situations
where the parties do not agree upon applicable law in advance. "If
choice of law problems arise in a transaction not covered by subsection
(2) of 1-105 and if the parties have not designated the governing law, the
forum's version of the Code 'applies to transactions bearing an appropri-
ate relation to the state.' ,164 The term "appropriate relation" is deliber-
ately left undefined, and the Official Comment is of little help in
ascertaining its intended meaning:
Where there is no agreement as to the governing law, the Act is
applicable to any transaction having an 'appropriate' relation to any
state which enacts it ...
Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state which has
enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the question what rela-
tion is 'appropriate' is left to judicial decision.6 5
The North Carolina Comment merely states that "the second sen-
tence provides that where there is no agreement as to the law that will
govern, and where there is sufficient relation to North Carolina, North
Carolina law will be used. This may be a modification of prior law."'66
The only North Carolina case in which Section 1-105 has been cited did
not address the point. 67
The significance of the "appropriate relation" test has diminished
insofar as interstate transactions are involved, since the UCC has been
adopted nationwide and the applicable law will, in any event, be the
same or nearly so. In an international context, however, the "appropri-
ate relation" test may yet prove of crucial importance when a decision
must be made whether to apply Code provisions to an international dis-
pute, or whether the commercial law of some foreign jurisdiction should
apply.6"
A. Drafling lint: Choice of Law Clause
Where international sales contracts are concerned, the best advice a
transactions is the long-recognized principle that the public policies of the forum
are not to be overridden by the application of foreign law....
The Code contains no public policy exception to party autonomy in choos-
ing applicable law, and none should be read in by the courts. It may well be that
for the general area of conflict of laws some restrictions are needed on allowing
parties to contract out from under local policies, but no such exception is required
in commercial law where states have almost unanimously agreed on the basic
Code policies. . . .There is no longer room in commercial law for a notion that
because the rules applied to a particular problem vary in their detail, those details
express some principle of strong local policy negating the parties' own choice of
law." Id. at 634.
64 Id. at 634-35.
65 Official Comment, UCC § 1-105.
66 Official Comment, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-1-105 (1965).
67 Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 431, 196 S.E.2d
711, 716 (1973).
68 Stegenerally Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 58, at 634-45; Wurfel, supra note 48,.at
285-87.
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North Carolina attorney can give his client is to insist that the contract
include a choice of law clause and that the law chosen be both familiar
and accessible. Normally this would mean that the contract should, if
possible, be governed by North Carolina law.
Nothing is more frustrating than attempting to litigate issues of for-
eign law in a North Carolina court. Locating reliable sources of such law
is almost impossible. The expense of this effort alone may be enough to
cool a client's passion for litigation, and, after several days spent trying to
track down the commercial laws of Norway, even the attorney's enthusi-
asm may begin to wane. The libraries of the State's law schools do not
purport to be repositories of the laws of the world's many nations, and
what little information is available is apt to be incomplete or hopelessly
out of date. To the extent that sources of foreign law can be found, they
are usually written in the foreign country's native tongue, and whatever
English translations are available usually fail to reflect the latest develop-
ments and amendments. Unless very large sums of money are involved,
justifying the association of foreign counsel and the employment of quali-
fied translators, the selection of foreign law may, as a practical matter,
leave one's client stranded in his own domestic courts without remedy or
hope for relief.
The UCC now provides the legal basis for choosing North Carolina
law and enforcing that choice. Thus, to the extent that the North Caro-
lina party has superior bargaining power or sufficient leverage to do so,
he should insist that North Carolina law govern the contract. If the
other side balks, the next best solution is to include no choice of law
clause at all, relying instead upon the last sentence of section 1-105 to the
effect that "failing such agreement this chapter applies to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to this State."'69 An argument can then
be made that the contract need not have been made in North Carolina in
order to have "an appropriate relation to this State." If the contract calls
for goods to be shipped from or to North Carolina, or if payment is to be
made by or to the North Carolina party, then a strong argument can be
made that the contract is so "appropriately related" to the forum as to
justify the application of North Carolina law.
III. Choice of Forum
A. Choice ofjudicial Forum70
Parties to international contracts have long sought and attempted to
eliminate uncertainty in their agreements by providing that a particular
court or forum designated by the parties should have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of any disputes which might arise. Such choice of forum clauses
69 UCC § 1-105; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 (1965).
70 See generally Wilner, Choice of Forum and Pubuh Poliy: Some Indcations of the Development in
United States Law of a Distinct "International" Public Policy, 2 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 29
(1977).
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have been disfavored, however, and until recently most American courts
uniformly held them unenforceable.
The issue of enforceability has usually arisen upon a motion to dis-
miss or to stay proceedings in a state or federal court pending the com-
mencement or completion of proceedings in the designated forum.
Traditionally, courts have rejected contractual efforts to "oust" them of
jurisdiction in circumstances where, but for the choice of forum clause,
such jurisdiction would clearly be appropriate. The common law rule in
North Carolina was stated in Skinner v. Gaither Corp. :71
It is settled law in this jurisdiction, as in most others, that when a
cause of action has arisen, the courts cannot be ousted .of their jurisdic-
tion by an agreement, previously entered into, to submit the rights and
liabilities of the parties to arbitration or to some other tribunal named in
the agreement.
72
Until recently, both state and federal courts routinely applied the
common law rule to international commercial contracts containing a
choice of forum clause.
Before 1971, United States courts were likely to disregard such a clause
whenever an American party to the agreement brought a suit in a
United States forum. The public policy-based reasons given by the
courts were three-fold: the superior convenience of the United States fo-
rum, possible prejudice abroad, and the likelihood of non-application of
United States law by the foreign court.
7 3
In 1971, however, the United States Supreme Court indicated that
the time may have come at long last to give effect to forum selection
clauses in international commercial contracts. The Court, in The Bremen
v. Zapata OShore Co. 7 acknowledged that the jurisdictional perogatives
guarded so jealously and for so long by domestic courts must, in some
cases, give way to the demands and realities of modern international
commerce. While the ultimate impact of Zapata is yet to be seen, this
opinion, by the highest court of the world's most important marketplace,
signals a remarkable shift in judicial attitude towards freedom of con-
tract in international commerce.
Zapata, a United States corporation, entered into a towage contract
with Unterweser, a German corporation, under which Unterweser
agreed to transport Zapata's oil-drilling rig from Louisiana to a point off
Ravenna, Italy. The contract provided that "[any dispute arising must
be treated before the London Court of Justice. ' 75 A storm damaged the
rig in transit, and it was towed to Tampa, Florida where Zapata prompt-
ly filed suit in admiralty in the U.S. District Court seeking damages
against Unterweser and its towing vessel for negligent towage and breach
of contract. Unterweser invoked the forum selection clause, moved to
71 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951).
72 Id. at 386-87, 67 S.E.2d at 269. See also Wurfel, supra note 48, at 279; H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, supra note 36, at 727-35.
73 Wilner, supra note 70, at 31.
74 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
75 Id. at 2.
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dismiss, and then filed its own breach of contract suit in the High Court
of Justice in London, the contractually-designated forum.
Acknowledging that "England had no interest in or contact with the
controversy other than the. . . forum-selection clause,"'7 6 the Court nev-
ertheless held that "such [forum selection] clauses are prmafacie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 77 The Court's
analysis reflects a new awareness of the important differences between
interstate and international commerce.
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas
commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States.
The barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to
a modest territory no longer does so. . . .The expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding sol-
emn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . .We cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
[Enforcement of forum selection clauses] accords with ancient con-
cepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the ex-
panding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts
of the world. Not surprisingly, foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to
have disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is not avail-
able, then in a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter.
The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on
a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in inter-
national trade, commerce and contracting. 78
The Court noted that "[f]orum-selection clauses have historically
not been favored by American courts,"' 79 and conceded that "this view
still has considerable acceptance." 80 Nevertheless the Court held that
[t]he argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to
'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigal legal fiction.
It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt
to reduce the power and business of a particular court and had little
place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once
essentially local now operate in world markets. It reflects something of a
provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals.8 1
The Court concluded that "in the light of present-day commercial reali-
ties and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
aside. ",82
The Court did hold that under some circumstances a forum selec-
76 Id. at 7.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id. at 8-9, 11-14.
79 Id. at 9.
80 Id. at 10.
81 Id. at 12.
82 Id. at 15.
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tion clause might yet be unenforceable, but placed a heavy burden of
proof on the party resisting enforcement:
The correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause
specifically unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasona-
ble and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching ...
.A] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public polic of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.83
The Court was not impressed by the argument that the "inconve-
nience" of the designated forum could, in and of itself, render the selec-
tion clause "unreasonable" and thus unenforceable:
Courts have also suggested that a forum clause, even though it is
freely bargained for and contravenes no important public policy of the
forum, may nevertheless be 'unreasonable' and unenforceable if the cho-
sen forum is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the action ...
... [W]hatever 'inconvenience' Zapata would suffer by being
forced to litigate in the contractual forum as it agreed to do was clearly
forseeable at the time of contracting. In such circumstances it should be
incumbent on the party seeking to escape this contract to show that trial
in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient
that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.
Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair,
unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain.8 4
Two years later, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,85 the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Zapata as to the enforceability of forum selection clauses, even
when it seemed apparent that enforcement of the parties' agreement
would achieve a result inconsistent with the strong public policies re-
flected in the federal securities laws.
Alberto-Culver had commenced a securities fraud action against
Scherk in the federal district court in Illinois, ignoring a contractual
clause providing for arbitration of "any controversy or claim [that] shall
arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof"8 6 before the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Paris. Scherk filed a motion to stay
pending arbitration. Alberto-Culver, relying on Wilco v. Swan, 7 argued
that an agreement to arbitrate could not deprive a defaulted investor of
his right to judicial remedy under the Securities Act of 1933. The district
court refused the stay, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 8 Citing the
Federal Arbitration Act8 9 and the "international" nature of the contract,
the Supreme Court reversed:
[T]he respondent's reliance on Wilco in this case ignores the signifi-
cant and, we find, crucial differences between the agreement involved in
83 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 16-18.
85 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
86 Id. at 508.
87 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
88 Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
89 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
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Wilco and the one signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract to
purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international
agreement. . .. Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly
different from those found controlling in Wico. . . A contractual provision speci-
fying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be
applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the or-
derliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.9°
The Court again demonstrated its commitment to reshape Ameri-
can law to fit the demands and expectations of international business-
men, even at the expense of domestic public policy:
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an inter-
national arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes,
but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the present case, for
example, it. is not inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that Al-
berto-Culver would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration
he might have sought an order in France or some other country en-
joining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with the litigation in the United
States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country might ultimately
have granted to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a
legal no-man's land would certainly damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into interna-
tional commercial agreements.
For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of the parties in
this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commer-
cial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in
accordance with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.
9 1
Professor Wilner has stated that:
The Court enforced a clause specifying a foreign arbitral forum,
even though the Court knew that enforcement could result in the non-
application of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, a piece of legislation
containing the highest internal public policy content. . . . Thus, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., as in The Bremen v. Zapata, one finds a recogni-
tion that a distinction exists between domestic transactions and transna-
tional transactions. The two cases embrace the view that transnational
transactions must be encouraged and that such transactions should
therefore be subject to less restrictive standards than purely domestic
transactions. In essence, Scherk and The Bremen reflect a recognition by
the Supreme Court of 'international public policy'.
9 2
It is as yet unclear whether state courts will follow the Supreme
Court's lead in Zapata and Alberto-Culver.93 Those cases, it must be
remembered, involved federal law; admiralty law in Zapata, the Federal
Arbitration Act in Alberto-Culver. The Court's uncharacteristically sweep-
ing language in these two cases, however, suggests that traditional antip-
athy toward forum selection clauses is a principle of American
90 417 U.S. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 516-17, 519-20 (emphasis added).
92 Wilner, supra note 70, at 33-34.
93 Id. at 32. For the attitude of foreign countries to forum selection clauses, seegenerally H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 36, at 738-40.
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jurisprudence whose time has come and gone. It seems only a matter of
time until the Zapata/Alberto-Culver analysis is applied to all choice of fo-
rum agreements contained in international commerce agreements.
94
B. Drafting Hint." Forum Selection Clauses
Professor Wilner has summarized it best:
What do the two Supreme Court cases and other recent judicial
pronouncements tell the draftsmen for a United States national who is
party to a transnational commercial agreement? It appears that if a
choice of forum clause calling for the exclusive jurisdiction of one or
more foreign judicial or arbitral fora is inserted and if the agreement is
transnational in nature, the United States court would enforce the
clause. . . .The conclusion to be drawn from the cases discussed is that
the United States party is unlikely to be able to sue in the United States
forum which, in order to take jurisdiction, would be compelled to disre-
gard the choice of forum clause on grounds such as forum nonconveniens
or public policy, based, among other things, on the fact that the foreign
forum is unlikely to apply United States law or United States law con-
cepts. Precisely this type of public policy argument was rejected in The
Bremen v. Zapata. . . .Whether, in diversity cases, the state courts and
the federal courts must follow the Supreme Court's pronouncements is
an unanswerable question. Nevertheless, it appears that, in drafting a
choice of forum clause which provides for foreign courts or foreign arbi-
tral tribunals, close attention must be paid to the likelihood that the
clause will be enforced by United States courts and that, as a result, a




The common law in this country condemned arbitration agreements
just as strongly as forum selection clauses. The last few decades, how-
ever, have witnessed a dramatic turnabout in American attitudes toward
arbitration. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Alberto-Culver, "[an
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a special-
94 The Supreme Court decision in Alberto-Culver was 5-4, with Justices Douglas, Brennan,
White and Marshall dissenting. The Seventh Circuit had reached precisely the opposite result
with one dissenting vote, Alberto-Culver v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973). The one lone
dissenter, however, was then Judge Stevens who has since replaced Justice Douglas on the
Court, suggesting the majority in favor of the Zapata/Alerto-Culver approach is now at least 6-3.
95 Wilner, supra note 68 at 34-37. See also Tai Kien Indus. Co. Ltd. v. M/V Hamburg, 528
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Note, Tai
Kien Industqy Co. Ltd v. M/V Hamburg.- Contractual Forum Selection Clears Another Hurdle, 2 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 173 (1977). In Tai Keen, the Ninth Circuit "outlined three instances
where forum selection clauses might be declared unreasonable: (I)where the law which will be
applied in the contract forum is contrary to a strong public policy of the forum where the suit
has been brought; (2)where the agreement is part of an adhesion contract; and (3)where there
would be such serious inconvenience to the party objecting to the contractual forum as to result
in denial of his day in court." Id. at 175-76.
96 See generally, McClelland, InternationalArbitration. A Practical Guidefor the Effective Use of the
System for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 INT'L LAW. 83 (1978); Comment,
International Commercial Disputes. The Alternative o/Arbitration, 2 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 142
(1977).
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ized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of the
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute. ' 97 The
principles enunciated in Zapata and Alberto-Culver, therefore, would apply
with equal force to arbitration agreements. Indeed, Alberto-Culver was it-
self an effort by defendant to enforce such an agreement pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act.
Apart from federal case law, however, state and federal statutes,
treaties, and international conventions have, in their cumulative effect,
successfully obliterated common law attitudes toward enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements.
On August 1, 1973, the Uniform Arbitration Act 98 became effective
in North Carolina. The Act provides that arbitration agreements "shall
be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except with the consent of all the
parties, without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy." 99
If one of the parties to the agreement refuses to arbitrate, the Act con-
templates proceedings to compel arbitration. Upon motion, the court is
directed to order the parties to proceed with arbitration unless the oppos-
ing party "denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. . . .'oo0 If
the opposing party contends that there is no agreement to arbitrate, the
Act provides that "such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dis-
pute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and ihe stay ordered if
found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court
shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration."'' The Act also states
that the arbitration procedures contained in the contract are to be en-
forced and, if the agreement is silent on the specific procedure to be fol-
lowed, the Act provides a statutory procedure to govern the arbitration
proceedings. 102
The Federal Arbitration Act10 3 provides that:
A written provision in. . . a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter aris-
ing out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
104
The federal Act specifically provides that " 'commerce', as herein
defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign
97 417 U.S. at 519. "In a sense, [an arbitration agreement] is more drastic than a choice-
of-forum clause since it removes the controversy from any court and places it in the hands of
private arbitrators." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 36, at 735.
98 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.1-.20 (Supp. 1977).
9 Id. § 1-567.2(a).
10 I. § 1-567.3(a).
101 Id. § 1-567.3(b).
102 Id. § 1-567.4-.9.
103 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
104 Id. § 2.
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nations .... ,,io5 If any party to an arbitration agreement institutes legal
action against his contract partner on an issue properly referable to arbi-
tration, the federal Act requires the court to "stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration."'
10 6
Clauses dealing with the enforceability of arbitration agreements
have also been included in a number of United States Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation. Our treaty with Belgium, for example,
provides that "[clontracts entered into between nationals and companies
of either Party and nationals and companies of the other Party, that pro-
vide for the settlement by arbitration of controversies, shall not be
deemed unenforceable within the territories of such other party merely
on the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration proceedings
is outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the
arbitrators is not that of such other Party."' 1 7 This treaty provision, of
course, makes international arbitration agreements enforceable only if
and to the extent that purely domestic agreements are enforceable.
Other treaty provisions, such as Article V(2), of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with the Netherlands signed March 27, 1956,
provides that arbitral awards "which are final and enforceable under the
laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed conclusive in enforce-
ment proceedings brought before the courts of competent jurisdiction of
either party."' 1 8 This provision gives a foreign arbitral award the same
status as a domestic award and precludes review by the enforcing party
of the proceedings before the arbitration tribunal. 0 9
In 1970, the United States adopted the 1958 United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards." l0 Article II(l) provides that "[elach Contracting State shall
105 Id. § I (emphasis added).
06 Id. § 3. Note, however, that "[a] proceeding to remedy a failure to arbitrate must be
brought in a court 'which, save for such agreements, would have jurisdiction,' Se., there must be
an independent basis for [federal] jurisdiction such as the existence of diversity of citizenship or
a federal question . . . or the presence of admiralty jurisdiction." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
supra note 36, at 736-37.
107 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, U.S.-Belgium, Art. III
(6), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1292-95, T.I.A.S. No. 5432.
108 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956, U.S.-Netherlands, 8
U.S.T. 2043, 2049, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
109 See, e.g., W. SURREY & C. SHAW, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 987-89 (1963). This somewhat dated work is being revised and reissued as a
multi-volume second edition by Surrey and Wallace. Part I is now available as I W. SURREY &
D. WALLACE, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 1977).
110 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970); U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. See
Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821 (1972); McMahon, Implementation of
the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MARITIME L. 735
(197 1); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements
United Nation's Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L.
REV. 1 (1971); Note, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: Untied States Accession, 2
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recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration."' Article 11(3) provides that "the court of a Con-
tracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration,
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed." '"1 2 United States acceptance of the Con-
vention is subject to two important reservations. First, "the United
States of America will apply the Convention on the basis of reciprocity,
to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the
territory of another contracting state."' 1 3 Second, the United States limits
application of the Convention to legal disputes "whether contractual or
not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the United
States." 1 14
Congress has enacted implementing legislation" 15 to incorporate the
Convention into federal law. Section 205116 is somewhat unusual in that
it provides that whenever state court proceedings involve an arbitration
agreement or an award which is covered by the Convention, the defend-
ant in such proceeding may remove the action to federal district court
''at any time before the trial .... This is significantly different from
practice under the Federal Arbitration Act, under which a defendant
may not remove a case to federal court unless there exists some other
appropriate basis for federal jurisdiction other than the Act itself. 1 7
IV. Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards
A. Enforcement of Domestic Judgments in Foreign Countries
The obvious goal of an action filed in a United States state or fed-
eral court against a foreign defendant is a final judgment awarding the
relief sought. Such a judgment has value, however, only if and to the
extent that courts in jurisdictions where the defendant has property or
other assets will enforce the American judgment against such assets.
The enforceability of foreign judgments, absent a treaty on the sub-
ject, is universally regarded as a question of domestic law to be governed
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67 (1971). See also Parsons & Whittlemore Overseas Co. v. Soci&6t G6n6rale
de I'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
l1l U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 110, at 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 3 U.N.T.S. at 40.
1M2 Id.
113 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (emphasis added).
114 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id. at §§ 201-208.
116 Id. at § 205.
117 See note 104 supra.
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by the jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought, and is not considered
an issue involving principles of international law.' 8 Thus, a North Car-
olina judgment creditor seeking to enforce or execute upon a local judg-
ment abroad will usually require the assistance of foreign counsel. The
rules governing enforcement of foreign judgments vary from country to
country, and "no useful generalization can be made beyond the state-
ment that most countries either will not recognize foreign judgments at
all or will do so only upon the basis of reciprocity." '"i 9 Foreign judg-
ments, in the United States and other countries, are not typically given
conclusive effect, and it is usually necessary to obtain a local judgment
based upon the foreign decree which can then be enforced under local
law and procedure. French courts, for example, take a dim view of for-
eign judgments against French nationals on the presumption that the
quality of justice available in other countries is inferior to that available
in France.' 20 Enforcement is generally less complicated in the United
Kingdom and other countries.' 2'
Potential problems relating to enforceability should be anticipated
and explored prior to commencement of the action. How the case is han-
dled at the pleading stage may have a significant impact upon the later
enforceability of any judgment obtained.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by section 328 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung).122  While the Code
presumes that foreign judgments generally will be enforceable, subsec-
tion 2 provides that a decree will not be enforced "[i]f the unsuccessful
defendant is a German and he did not appear in the proceeding, insofar
as the summons or order initiating the proceedings was not served upon
him personally in the state of the trial court or through German judicial
assistance .... 1'23 The enforceability of a default judgment, while
valid under state or federal law, will thus depend upon the manner in
which service of process was effected. As a result, service upon a German
defendant solely by international registered mail or by publication, while
clearly adequate to invoke the court's jurisdiction under domestic law,
will be inadequate to render the judgment enforceable against a German
defendant. A German who is not served personally "in the state of the
118 H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 36, at 686.
119 W. SURREY & C. SHAW, supra note 109, at 986.
.120 See, e.g., Nadlemann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Mone Judgmentsr: One Down and More
To o, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72 (1964); Nadlemann, Recognition of Foreign MoneJudgments in France,
5 AM. J. COMP. L. 248 (1956).
121 See, e.g., Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments
in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367 (1963); Golomb, Recognition of Foreign MonqJudg-
ments."A Goal Oriented Approach, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604, 610 (1969); Lorenzen, The Enforcement
of American judgments Abroad, 29 YALE L.J. 188 (1919); Nadlemann, Reprisals Against American
Judgments?, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1184 (1952).
122 See generally Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Monq Judgments in the
Federal Republic ofGermany, 11 INT'L LAW. 261 (1977).
123 Id. at 264.
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trial court" or in Germany "through German judicial assistance" may
with some confidence ignore state or federal proceedings against him in
the United States, secure in the knowledge that section 328 will protect
him against attempts to enforce the forthcoming default judgment. The
unfortunate American plaintiff, having obtained a valid domestic judg-
ment, will not likely be permitted to commence a new proceeding on the
same cause of action merely to correct his oversight in effecting service.
Plaintiff's only alternative at this point, and not a very palatable one,
will be to sue the defendant in Germany. As far as enforceability is con-
cerned, plaintiff's case was, for all practical purposes, over before it ever
really began, for even if the German defendant were inclined to appear
and defend himself in the American action, he would be foolish to do so
unless properly served as provided in section 328.
B. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in US Courts12 4
What happens when a foreign plaintiff seeks to enforce a judgment
obtained in a foreign court against a North Carolina defendant? A local
attorney may be called upon for advice on this issue either by the foreign
judgment creditor, who wants to know how he can enforce his judgment,
or by the North Carolina defendant, who wants to avoid judgment if
possible.
Surprisingly, there are no North Carolina cases or statutes which
specifically address the issue of recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments obtained in the courts of foreign countries. 125 Case law in North
Carolina is limited to the effect to be given in North Carolina to a judg-
ment rendered by a sister state. The focal point of these cases is the "Full
Faith and Credit Clause," contained in Article IV of the Constitution,
which is not applicable to judgments of courts in foreign countries.
As Professor Wurfel reported:
Since the full faith and credit mandate of the Federal Constitution
does not apply to foreign-country judgments, the issue of their recogni-
tion rests entirely in comity. Three views on this subject are possible: (1)
no recognition will be given to the judgment of a foreign country unless
a treaty between the two nations concerned expressly provides for such
recognition; (2) recognition will be extended on a basis of reciprocity;
and (3) recognition will be accorded in all cases without regard to recip-
rocal treatment being extended by the law of the judgment nation. The
first view is the rule in France and a few other civil law countries. The
second is the federal rule as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hilton v.
Guyot and the third is the New York conflict of laws rule on the point. 1
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Hilton v. Guyot,127 although decided in 1895, remains the most com-
plete treatment by the United States Supreme Court of the issue of rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments. Plaintiffs had
124 See generally Wurfel, Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 50 N.C.L. REV. 21 (1971).
125 Id. at 69.
126 Id. at 69-70.
127 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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obtained a judgment in France of which almost $200,000 remained un-
paid. Plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgment in the Circuit Court for
the Southern District of New York, but defendants argued not only that
they were not indebted to the plaintiffs, but that the judgment was pro-
cured in France by fraud. The Court, in refusing to hold the French
judgment conclusive upon American courts, established a rule of comity
for the enforcement of foreign-country judgments. 128 Although Hilton v.
Guyot has never been overruled, many legal scholars contend that the
"comity" or "reciprocity" rule established in that case no longer reflects
modern attitudes toward recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. 129
128 "The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or
statute of this country. But when, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the subject,
the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is,
whenever it becomes necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits
regularly brought before them. . . . Id. at 163.
" 'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. . . . Id. at 164.
"[lilt clearly appears that, at the time of the separation of this country from England, the
general rule was fully established that foreign judgments in personam were prima facie evidence
only, and not conclusive of the merits of the controversy between the parties. . . .. Id. at 187.
Indeed, the rule that the judgment is to be prima facie evidence for the plaintiff would be a
mere delusion if the defendant might still question it by opening all or any of the original merits
on his side; for under such circumstances it would be equivalent to granting a new trial. . . . Id.
at 190.
"[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the
system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other
special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case
should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new
trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law
or in fact. The defendants, therefore, cannot be permitted, upon that general ground, to contest
the validity or the effect of the judgment sued on. Id. at 203.
"It appears, therefore, that there is hardly a civilized nation on either continent which, by
its general law, allows conclusive effect t9 an executory foreign judgment for the recovery of
money. . . . The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that judgments
rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments
are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued
upon in this country, but are prima facte evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's
claim. . . .. In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of
the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by
reason of injustice done to another; but upon the broad ground that international law is
founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recog-
nized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is our judicial
duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive." d. at
227-228.
129 "While the Supreme Court [in Hilton v. Guyot] enunciated a reciprocity rule, its rule
was subjected to criticism and does not appear to be in accordance with the majority of Ameri-
can decisions today. For example, New York rejected the doctrine of reciprocity. Commenta-
tors have noted that the trend in American jurisdictions is to afford conclusive effect to foreign
judgments." W. SURREY & C. SHAW, supra note 109, at 986.
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The lingering confusion as to the proper "federal" rule is probably
of little importance today, given that foreign judgment creditors will usu-
ally attempt to enforce their judgments in the state court where the
American defendant resides or in the federal courts for that district upon
grounds of diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court in Hilon v. Guyo/
could not have anticipated the impact of the Court's later decision in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins' 30 to the effect that "there is no federal general common
law.' 13 1 Erie, together with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. ,132 estab-
lished the rule that federal courts in diversity cases are to apply the con-
flict of law rules of the state in which they are sitting. 133 Thus, in most
cases, the "federal" rule established in Hilon v. Guyot will be inapplicable
in an action in state or federal court to enforce a foreign-country judg-
ment. Lower court decisions since Erie and Klaxon clearly reflect an un-
derstanding on the part of federal courts that they are to apply the state
rule in enforcing foreign-country judgments. 134
Bilateral or multilateral treaties with other nations on the subject of
judgment recognition and enforcement would, of course, preempt state
law and would establish a uniform federal rule for the United States.1
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As in 1895, however, the United States is not presently a party to any
treaty providing for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments.
If an action is brought in North Carolina to enforce a judgment
obtained abroad, North Carolina law would govern the effect to be given
that judgment. The more difficult problem, however, is to determine
what the North Carolina law is on the point. As mentioned above, there
are no cases directly on point, and the General Assembly has not enacted
statutory guidelines in this area. As a result, the issue remains open to
the effective advocacy and imagination of counsel. As Professor Wurfel
concludes:
Any of the three rules regarding recognition could conceivably be
adopted by North Carolina in the absence of a treaty between the
United States and the country concerned which expressly required rec-
ognition. Adoption of the severe French view seems unlikely. The re-
quirement of reciprocity in the limited factual circumstances found in
Hiion is a possibility and would be consistent with the language of the
two North Carolina dicta. This view has not been favored by most legal
writers, but in the international community there is merit to the reci-
procity concept that the golden rule should cut both ways. Finally,
North Carolina could follow the New York conflicts rule that if thejuris-
130 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
131 Id. at 78.
132 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
133 Wurfel, supra note 124, at 72.
134 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), af'd 453 F.2d 435, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carl-
son, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966); Note, Con/Acts of Laws-Enforement of Foreign Judgments b?
Federal Courts, 49 N.C.L. REv. 747 (1971).
135 Wurfel, supra note 124, at 73; Note, supra note 134, at 750 n.20.
134 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
dictional foundation upon which the foreign-country judgment is based
is not successfully attacked, it will be given full credit in the forum with-
out review of the merits. 136
One thing would seem to be certain. North Carolina courts are not
likely to give greater recognition to foreign-country judgments than they
do to the decrees of sister states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
As a result, the defenses which are available to a sister state judgment
should be available to a party resisting enforcement of a foreign-country
judgment. If this analysis is correct, a foreign-country judgment should
be subject to attack on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, fraud in the pro-
curement, or as being against public policy. 137 "Defects in foreign judg-
ments such as extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction over the person will
preclude enforcement in American courts, as will lack of due notice and
failure to provide an opportunity to be heard. Judgments which are not
final will also be denied enforcement. In addition, those judgments
which do not accord with the public policy of the enforcing state or
which are deemed contrary to 'natural justice' will be denied enforce-
ment."13
C Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
The strong recent trend favorable to awards by foreign arbitral
tribunals is in striking contrast to U.S. attitudes toward the recognition
and enforcement of foreign-country judgments. Action at both the state
and federal levels in recent years has gone far toward according foreign
arbitral awards conclusive and binding effect on the United States. In-
deed, the growing sense of confidence on the part of parties to interna-
tional contracts that their arbitration agreements will be honored and
awards enforced has led to a dramatic increase in the use of arbitration
as a means of international conflict settlement. 3 9
North Carolina courts will not review an arbitral award on the mer-
its, and the award will be vacated only if it was procured by "corruption,
fraud or other undue means," or there was evident partiality or miscon-
duct on the part of the arbitrators, or for other reasons related to the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings.14°
The North Carolina Arbitration Act requires the successful party to
have his award confirmed here, 14 1 and upon confirmation of the award
as provided in the Act, a "judgment or decree shall be entered in con-
136 Wurfel, supra note 124, at 73-74.
137 Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 167 S.E.2d 549 (1969); In re Blalock, 233 N.C.
493, 64 S.E.2d 848 (1951); Howland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 58 S.E.2d 104 (1950).
138 W. SURREY & C. SHAW, supra note 109, at 985-86.
139 "One of the most important reasons why a diversity between the enforcement ofjudg-
ments and arbitral awards exists is that the United States has entered into a series of bilateral
treaties with regard to enforcement of arbitration awards while there are presently no treaties
governing the enforcement of foreign judicial decrees." Id. at 985.
140 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
141 Id. § 1-567.12.
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formity therewith and be docketed and enforced as any other judgment
or decree."' 142 The provision authorizing appeals does not provide for
appellate review of alleged legal or factual error on the part of the arbi-
trators. The Federal Arbitration Act sets forth grounds for vacating an
arbitral award similar to those contained in the North Carolina stat-
ute. ' 43 In addition to the state and federal statutes, Article V of the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards 4 4 provides that:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforce-
ment is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recog-
nized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral pro-
cedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, fail-
ing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settle-
ment 'by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country.
Section 207 45 of the implementing legislation for the Convention
specifies that
within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention
is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having
jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as
142 Id. § 1-567.15.
143 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1925).
I- Se id. § 201.
145 Id. § 207.
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against any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recogni-
tion or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention. 1
4 6
The grounds for vacating arbitral awards contained in the various
statutes and treaties governing arbitration agreements may prove useful
in another context. Since the United States has no treaties with other
countries relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign-country
judgments, and since the law in North Carolina is not at all clear on the
subject, North Carolina courts might look to the law governing arbitra-
tion agreements for guidance in deciding which foreign judgments
should be enforced and which should be disregarded.147 If a foreign-
country judgment would not be enforceable as an award under the ap-
plicable arbitration statutes or treaties, then a strong argument can be
made that such judgment should not be given conclusive effect in North
Carolina.
Question and Answer
Mr. Farnsworth: As you (Michael Almond) were talking about choice
of forum, two questions occurred to me. First, if I recall correctly, Bremen
v. Zapata Offshore Oil Co. was a towage contract case and I was curious as
to whether you thought that fact, in light of the fact that choice of forum
clauses are rather traditional in maritime contracts-more traditional
than in sales contracts-made that a slightly uneasy authority to rely on
in a straight sale of goods contract?
The second question is this: My recollection is that Zapata deals with
ousting of jurisdiction, that is, whether a choice of forum clause will be
honored in the United States by a refusal of jurisdiction on the assump-
tion that jurisdiction would be taken by London. I am not sure that is a
good thing and it might push me away from choice of forum to arbitra-
tion.
For instance, assume you are dealing with someone in Timbuktu
and he does not know anything about Zapata. If you choose the North
Carolina forum, he may say that he has never heard of such a clause. If
you are subject to the jurisdiction of Timbuktu absent the clause, the
clause does not make any difference. Therefore, if you choose North Car-
146 Id.
147 The impact of local "public policy" upon the enforcement of arbitral awards is no
doubt much diminished. If an arbitration agreement will be enforced notwithstanding its incon-
sistency with the public policies of the forum, then it would seem to follow that any arbitral
award forthcoming from such proceedings must survive the public policy defense and would be
held enforceable. See text accompanying notes 70-117 supra. If local policy must give way to
enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate, then the Zapatal/Aberto-Culver rationale would re-
quire that the award likewise be held enforceable. See text accompanying notes 70-95 supra.
Courts, in dealing with international contracts at least, will thus be required to enforce non-
judicial awards against local citizens, even though such awards may be totally irreconcilable
with the fundamental public policies of the forum.
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olina as the forum in that instance, the forum clause is not usually going
to help you. If you choose Timbuktu as the forum, the clause will help,
but it is going to help the party who wants to ensure that you get sued in
Timbuktu. The courts in North Carolina have nothing to do with it.
Hence, in so far as Zapata is an ousting of jurisdiction case, it seems that
to raise the question of whether one should insert a choice of forum
clause is a little hazardous and works against the American party.
Mr. Almond: There is one circuit court case which says essentially
that if you refuse to follow the line, it refuses to enforce the choice of
forum clause. The rationale was that the Supreme Court told us in ad-
miralty towage cases to enforce choice of forum clauses. However, that
may not have any application to any other case. I had my answer pre-
pared, and I was going to say that the authorities do not agree with that,
until I realized that one of the authorities is here and he does not know
whether he agrees with it or not.
However, there is authority for the proposition that the Bremen v.
Zapata Ofshore Oil Co. case is certainly not limited to admiralty cases,
particularly when you combine it with the Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk case,
which involved an arbitration clause. The Alberto-Culver clause was more
clearly a forum selection clause than this new case, Tai Kien Industr Co.,
Ltd v. M/V Hamburg, which I think is cited in the outline.
In Tai Kin, which is a circuit court opinion, the two contract par-
ties had specified a particular forum and one of the contract parties was
sued in the United States by a third party. The second contract partner,
who had not been sued, then attempted to sue the first contract party in
the U.S. court. The U.S. court did not allow that, saying it made no
difference that it would be judicially economical to have all the parties
and all the claims in one lawsuit. Although judicial proceedings had
been instigated by an outside third party and the second contract party
had some claims against the first party, the court would not allow the
intervention. In other words, the court told the second contract party
that it must present its claims in the jurisdiction specified in the forum
clause.
Zapata involved a contract between a German company and an
American company to tow an oil crane across the ocean and put it in the
Mediterranean. The parties specified, however, that all disputes would
be tried before the London High Court of Justice. The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that this contract had nothing to do with England
or the High Court of London, but they enforced the clause, ousting the
Federal District Court of Miami of jurisdiction.
The importance of Zapata is the following: assume the United States
is the selected jurisdiction and that another party obtained a judgment
in a jurisdiction which is not the selected jurisdiction. Upon attempting
to enforce the judgment in the United States, is there not an argument
that the court over there lacked the jurisdiction? This is one of the tradi-
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tional bases for resisting the enforcement of an award or judgment. At
least it would be a basis for an estoppel against bringing an action on
that foreign judgment. They would have to bring the action in the U.S.
courts.
Question: What are the North Carolina rules about place of contract?
Mr. Almond: Prior to the adoption of the UCC, North Carolina con-
flicts law looked at lex loci celebrationis. North Carolina courts held that
in interpreting a contract made outside this state, the established princi-
ple is that the law of the state or country where the contract was made is
the rule by which its validity, exposition and consequences are to be de-
termined. Moreover, it is a generally accepted principle that the test for
the place of contract is the place at which the last act essential to the
meeting of the minds was done by either of the parties. That quotes
Professor Seymour Wurfel's excellent article in the North Carolina Law
Review, Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243,
275 (1970).
Question: Are you aware of the North Carolina Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Act?
Mr. Almond: I think that I have looked at that and concluded at one
time that the Act was only for sister state judgments. I believe that the
Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act is a uniform act which is
designed to help the states implement their obligations under the full
faith and credit clause, and that it does not apply to foreign countries.
Question: Section 3(d) of your presentation outline says always use
local law. Mr. Farnsworth says pick and choose. Do you stand by your
"always"?
Mr. Almond: Yes, unless you know that you are going to do some-
thing to zap your partner and you know that you cannot be held respon-
sible for it under the laws of other jurisdictions, but that you can be held
responsible under this jurisdiction. That would be a good time to specify
that the other jurisdiction's law is to apply. Without a really good reason
like that or without some remedy available in another jurisdiction, that
you know of in advance, I would pick North Carolina law. If you are
writing on a clean slate and you have not thought about the above conse-
quences, I certainly would recommend applying North Carolina law.
We found ourselves in a terrible situation once where we wanted to
get out of our contract with a Belgian steel making company. We did
not take the steel that they had and we were going to claim that the
sharp decline in steel prices had so altered the conditions of the contract
that we ought to be able to get out of it. However, there was an arbitra-
tion clause which specified that Belgian law would apply and we had a
difficult time trying to determine the applicable Belgian commercial law.
We discovered that it was the Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, with certain conditions and reservations imposed by Belgium.
So, the situation consisted of a Belgian plaintiff, a North Carolina de-
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fendant arbitrating in English in Montreal, and the application of Bel-
gian law-it was impossible.
If you have a small import-export transaction that is less than
$100,000 and you get into a situation where foreign law is applied, you
may be without a remedy in the long run because of the overall cost.
Mr. Farnsworth: I would say that the above mentioned Belgian case is
one in which our advice does not conflict in the least. It seems to me that
it would be foolish to apply Belgian law if the arbitration is to take place
in Montreal, unless you have already agreed to invite three Belgians over
as arbiters. If you decide to choose the High Court of London, for exam-
ple, would you really think that it would be a good thing to choose North
Carolina law and have to transport your experts there? That is the kind
of thing that I am suggesting. If you can predict where a dispute will be
litigated, as by a choice of forum clause or by an arbitration clause
(which depends not only on where the arbiters sit but also on which legal
system will be used), it is not a bad idea to consider that third legal
system, especially one in which Americans feel less uneasy than Belgians
do.
Mr. Almond: Generally, in our export contracts we have an order
form on the front and voluminous terms and conditions of sale on the
back. Within the terms and conditions of sale, we include (1) a clause
stating that there be no contract until the order form is accepted by the
U.S. party, by his signature at the bottom; and (2) a consent to jurisdic-
tion clause which is clearly in North Carolina, I believe. You can waive
a personal defense in advance, which amounts to lack of personal juris-
diction.
In addition, we put in a choice of forum clause and a choice of law
clause whereby the parties consent to the jurisdiction of the North Caro-
lina courts. This stipulates that any actions arising out of this agreement
shall be brought exclusively in the North Carolina courts and that the
applicable law is the law of the state of North Carolina. We secure a
signature on that and it comes back for our signature. We do not sell
people things if they will not agree to that. There is the risk that that is
an uneven contract, but it is a risk that I think we will take.
Mr. Farnsworth: If you are lucky enough to have everything your
way, then there is no problem. However, if for example you are buying
and you have to furnish a letter of credit, I think that you are going to
have to sue on the contract. If you do not have some kind of jurisdiction
over the foreign seller in your own place, then it is hard to imagine how
you are not going to be suing in the courts of the other country. I think it
is quite true that the Swiss case involved questions of to what extent did
defects give rise to the rights to reject the goods when they were tendered
and ultimately call off the whole deal. The question of "to what extent"
is often raised where you want to get out of a contract, and the defects
may involve both technical defects, as in a complicated television system,
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and delays and failures to give assurances. In any case, a practical mat-
ter is involved. Whereas our feeling is that we can tell them a lot of
American law, I think three reasonably well-informed Swiss commercial
judges will reach as sensible a decision on that question under Swiss law
as under American law which they were reading in Swiss-French transla-
tion.
